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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS
The Authority To Issue An Attorney General's Opinion
The Attorney General of Mississippi is empowered by the law of
this state to issue written answers to questions posed by authorized
persons. Section 7-5-25, Miss. Code Ann. (1972) sets forth a list of
those authorized to request such opinions. In general, the list includes
the governor, the legislature, the chancery and circuit court clerks,
the secretary of state, the various state departments, state officers and
commissioners operating under the laws of this state, the heads and
trustees of state institutions, district attorneys, the various county and
city officials and their attorneys.
The Attorney General's Opinions function as a protective mea-
sure, so that there can be no civil or criminal liability against any per-
son or governmental entity who has properly requested the opinion,
setting forth all governing facts on the basis of which the Attorney
General's Office has prepared and delivered a legal opinion, and
which the requesting party has followed in good faith. This general
proposition holds true, unless a court of competent jurisdiction, after
a full hearing, shall judicially declare that such opinion is manifestly
wrong and without substantial support. No opinion shall be given or
considered if said opinion is given after suit is filed or prosecution
begun.
Issuance Of An Attorney General's Opinion*
Attorneys in the Attorney General's Office are assigned to specific
areas of law in which they specialize. After an opinion request is
received by the Office of the Attorney General, it is assigned to the at-
torney whose area of law it might concern. He then researches the
problem and prepares a draft of the opinion or answer. This draft is
then submitted to the Opinion Committee which is composed of nine
attorneys in the office, including the Attorney General. The Opinion
Committee meets twice weekly, on Tuesday and Thursday. At the
meeting of the Committee, the draft is discussed and reviewed. The
Committee either suggests changes, requests more information, or ap-
proves the draft if it is agreed that the analysis of the law is correct.
Should changes be suggested or more information requested, the
Committee sends the draft back to the attorney for revision. Upon
correction or addition, the draft is returned to the Committee where it
is again processed. If there are no further changes, additions, or cor-
rections suggested, the draft will be given final approval and issued as
an official Attorney General's Opinion.
*Prepared by Attorney General's Office
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OPINION NO. SO 79-13
SUBJECT: WHETHER LIMITED WARRANTIES ON
AUTOMOBILES MAY CONSTITUTE THE WRITING OF
INSURANCE UNDER THE MISSISSIPPI CODE. A so-called limited
warranty may meet all the requirements of a contract of insurance.
This is especially so when the service is offered by a company which
hopes to profit by the sale of the service. An automobile dealer,
however, can offer an identical contract which will retain the
character of a limited warranty. This is because the dealer's purpose
is to enhance his competitive posture rather than increase his profit
directly by the service.
DATE RENDERED: May 3, 1979
REQUESTED BY: Mr. George Dale
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by Robert E.
Sanders, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Selected portion of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as
follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your letter of request
dated February 7, 1979, and has assigned it to me for research and
reply. Your request reads as follows:
Re: What constitutes the writing of Insurance as per Title 83,
Chapter 5, Section 5, Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated.
This department respectfully requests an opinion concerning the in-
terpretation of the above statute.
The information we have would indicate that the proposed
corporation would be operated in conjunction with a franchise new car
automobile dealership. The dealer proposes to form a separate
corporation with a brother-sister relationship to the existing dealership
to issue the limited warranties it proposes to sale. The warranties would
be offered on both new cars sold by the dealership and selected used
cars that have been examined and are considered acceptable for the
limited warranty.
The warranties proposed would be limited warranties and would
only cover mechanical malfunctions of the engine and drive line
components and would exclude any damage caused by an accident.
The proposed warranties would be offered for a specified period of
time, probably not more than two years on new cars and not more than
one year on selected and approved used cars, with an unlimited mileage
allowance during the specified period. In addition this warranty will




We are, therefore, requesting an opinion from your office on two
questions that need to be answered:
(1) Is this vehicle service contract an insurance program and,
(2) If it is an insurance program can an automobile dealership offer
its own customers the vehicle service contract without being
licensed as an insurance company by the State of Mississippi?
Your opinion request seeks to determine whether limited
warranties sold by an entity other than the manufacturer or vendor of
the product to which the limited warranty applies are insurance
within Section 83-5-5, and the distinction, if any, between an entity
and the vendor of the product for purposes of Section 83-5-3. Your
questions appear to be ones of first impression in this state. A conflict
of authority exists among states which have considered these
questions in the past and as yet it appears that no majority rule has
emerged.
An examination must first be made of the nature of a warranty.
Black's Law Dictionary defines a personal property warranty as:
A statement or representations made by the seller of goods,
contemporaneously with and as a part of the contract of sale, though
collateral to the express object of it, having reference to the character,
quality, or title of the goods, by which he promises or undertakes that
certain facts are or shall be as he then represents them. A promise or
agreement by seller that article sold has certain qualities or that seller
has good title thereto. A statement of fact representing the quality or
character of goods sold, made by the seller to induce the sale, and relied
on by the buyer.
The Uniform Commercial Code requires a sale for any of its
warranty provisions to be effective. The hallmark of a warranty is the
"promise of indemnity against defects in the article sold," C.J.S. Vol.
44 p. 473, but an essential prerequisite is that the one offering such a
special indemnity be the manufacturer or seller of the product. C.J.S.
Vol. 77 p. 1117 states "warranty is an incident to a contract of sale,
and assumes or necessarily implies the existence thereof. A warranty
is not an essential element of a sale, which can exist without it, but
there can be no warranty without a sale." Anyone other than the
manufacturer or seller offering such indemnity does not have
standing to properly classify his offer as a warranty.
Mississippi has long recognized the requirement of a sale by the
manufacturer before a warranty may exist. Watts v. Adair, 52 So. 2d
649 and Stribling Brothers Machinery Co. v. Girod Co., 124 So. 2d
289. The Uniform Commerical Code has expanded the category of
sales which enable a warranty to be recognized to sales by merchants
regularly engaged in selling the product sold, but nothing in this
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state's statute or common law negates the necessity of sale. A
warranty is properly viewed as a service incident to the business of
selling the product and the purpose of merely to enhance the
competitive posture of the seller.
Insurance is defined in Vance on Insurance, Third Edition (1951)
at page 2. Five elements which comprise a contract of insurance are
set forth as:
(a) The insured possesses an interest of some kind susceptible of
pecuniary estimation, known as an insurable interest.
(b) The insured is subject to a risk of loss through the destruction or
impairment of that interest by the happening of designated peril.
(c) The insurer assumes that risk of loss.
(d) Such assumption is part of a general scheme to distribute
natural losses among a large group of persons bearing somewhat
similar risks.
(e) As consideration for the insurer's promise, the insured makes a
ratable contribution, called a premium, to a general insurance fund.
A contract possessing only the three elements first named is a risk-
shifting device but not a contract of insurance, which is a risk-
distributing device; but, if it possesses the other two as well, it is a
contract of insurance, whatever be its name or its form.
Clearly what has been labeled as a limited warranty in the
opinion request meets all the requirements of a contract of insurance.
This, coupled with the fact that the service is not offered by the
manufacturer or seller but rather by a company which hopes to profit
only by the sale of the service, leads to the conclusion that the service
has been mislabeled. The contract in question is one of insurance. The
fact that it covers only defects inherent in the article insured only
limits the coverage of the insurance; it does not change the nature of
the contract.
At the same time an automobile dealership can offer a true
limited warranty which might be virtually identical to the contract of
insurance offered by another. The distinction exists as the dealer has
standing, as vendor, to offer a warranty and the overriding purpose is
to enhance his competitive posture in the sale of a product rather than
merely to enlarge the scope of his business or to increase his profit
directly by this service. He could, of course, offer such a warranty on-
ly on cars he sells and not those of another dealer.
Sincerely,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: +,
Robert E. Sanders
RES: cv Special Assistant Attorney General
[Vol. 1:345
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OPINION NO. SO 79-14
SUBJECT, PERMISSIBLE ROAD BLOCKS AND CHECK
POINTS UNDER DELAWARE V. PROUSE. Probable cause is
required for police to detain a motorist to check his licence. A
roadblock at which all passing motorists' driving licenses are checked
is permissible.
DATE RENDERED. May 16, 1979
REQUESTED BY Mayor Chastaine Flynt
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by Larry J.
Stroud, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General A. F. Summer has received your opinion
request of May 4, 1979 and has assigned it to me for reply. In your
letter you state:
It came to my attention from the news media that the United States
Supreme Court recently held that it was unconstitutional to set up road
blocks or check points for the purpose of checking drivers license to the
general public without cause of any law violation.
The police officers of the Town of Flowood have periodically in the
past set up road blocks detaining people in their normal travel on the
streets and highways of Flowood.
Before issuing a directive to our police department under these
conditions to cease and desist such practice I would appreciate your
legal opinion as to the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court before I issue
such a directive.
The case you are referring to is Delaware v. Prouse, 47 L. W.
4323 (March 27, 1979). In this case the Supreme Court held that the
police cannot arbitrarily pull over a motorist to check his license, in
the absence of probable cause. However, the Court specifically stated
it limited its opinion to an arbitrary spot check of a motorist, and
went so far as to suggest that a roadblock where all passing motorists
are checked as a possible method to be used to enforce traffic law and
public safety.
In the light of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Delaware v. Prouse, it is our opinion that a roadblock where all
motorists' driving licenses are checked is permissible.
19791
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Trusting that the. above will be of value to you, I am and remain
Sincerely yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: cT: t;
Larry J. Stroud
Special Assistant Attorney General
LJS: cm
OPINION NO. SO 79-15
SUBJECT RIGHT OF HUNTING CLUB LESSEE OF SIX-
TEENTH SECTION LAND TO PREVENT CROSSING BY
NONMEMBER. A hunting club lessee may prevent the crossing of
leased land by those wishing to fish in a stream running through the
land. If the stream is a "public waterway," nonmembers may fish in
the stream by gaining access by boat or wading.
DATE RENDERED: April 25, 1979
REQUESTED BY: Representative Robert Y. Wiseman
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by Mack
Cameron, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Selected portion of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as
follows:
Attorney General A. F. Summer has received your letter dated
April 23, 1979 and has referred it to me for research and reply. Your
letter stated:
One of my people has been having some static from a hunting club
because he was walking across their leased land getting to a fishing
stream running through club leased property.
Can they legally prevent him from going across club land and
fishing in a stream running through club leased land?
Section 29-3-54, Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, states:
Any leaseholder of sixteenth section land or land granted
in lieu thereof, shall be authorized to post such land against
trespassers; provided that such posting shall not prohibit the
inspection of said lands by individuals responsible for the
management or supervision thereof acting in their official
capacity. In the event hunting or fishing rights have been
leased on lands classified as forest land, the holder of such
rights and the state forestry commission shall be authorized to
post such land against trespassers.
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Thus, pursuant to the above cited section, lessee hunting club
could prevent your constituent from going across the leased land and
fishing in a stream running through the leased property. However, if
the stream meets the criteria of a "public waterway" as defined in
Section 51-1-4, Mississippi Code of 1972, then individuals would have
the right to fish in the stream after gaining access from the stream
itself by either a boat or by wading....
Trusting the above will be of assistance to you, I am
Sincerely yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: t
Mack Cameron
Special Assistant Attorney General
MC: db
Enclosure
OPINION NO. SO 79-16
SUBJECT: PROCEDURE REQUIRED FOR A CHANGE IN THE
LOCATION OF A POLLING PLACE; THE RIGHT OF A
MUNICIPALITY TO REQUIRE AN APPOINTED EMPLOYEE TO
RESIDE WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS. A change in the
location of a polling place requires prior submission for federal
approval. Approval may be sought by application to the Attorney
General of the United States.
In the recent case of Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th
Cir. 1975), the court held that a municipality could, as a matter of
policy, require all municipal employees to reside within the corporate
limits, so long as no federal restraints were violated.
DATE RENDERED: May 28, 1979
REQUESTED BY. Mrs. Dorothy N. Sheffield
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by S. E.
Birdsong, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General A. F. Summer has received your letter and has
assigned it to me for research and reply.
Your letter states:
I would like to receive an opinion on the following:
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(1) The City Hall Annex has been used as a voting place for some
years, but as of this year we no longer have the space required,
and we advised the Board of Supervisors and the Circuit Clerk
in March, 1979. Now the Board of Supervisors advised
(5/18/79) that the time was not sufficient to change for August
7th election.
Was the time given sufficient enough?
(2) If you are an appointed employee of a municipality, are you
required to live within the corporate limits of the City?
Thank you for your response.
A change in the location of polling places constitutes a change
requiring prior submission for Federal approval under Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Perkins v. Matthews 400 U.S. 379, 27
L. Ed. 2d 476, 915 S. Ct. 431 (1971). Such approval may be sought by
application to the Attorney General of the United States. Under such
circumstances, our office would not be able to state whether the time
given is sufficient.
The City of Picayune has a mayor and four councilmen. We find
no statutory requirement that an appointed city employee of such a
municipality be required to live within the corporate limits of the
municipality.
As to municipal employees under civil service, reference is made
to House Bill No. 1007, Chapter No. 322, Laws of 1979, effective on
March 1, 1979, which amended Section 21-31-15 of the Mississippi
Code of 1972, Annotated, to read:
... All applicants for a position of any kind under civil service must be
a citizen of the United States and an elector of the county in which he
resides and must meet only such bona fide occupational residency
requirements as may be determined by the municipal board of civil
service commissions or the governing authority of the municipality....
In Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184 et al. v. City of
Hattiesburg. Miss., 263 So. 2d 767 (1972), the court considered a city
ordinance requiring all members of the Fire Department and all other
city employees under civil service to maintain their domicile and
principal place of residence within the corporate limits during their
employment, ruling that the ordinance was valid and not an improper
classification as to firemen. On May 16, 1979, the Mississippi
Supreme Court decided Brown v. City of Meridian, No. 51,162,
wherein the Court cited Hattiesburg Firefighters as holding that a
municipality may require its employees to reside within the corporate
limits. Brown involved a municipal policeman covered by civil
service who was dismissed because he maintained his residence
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outside the corporate limits when a resolution of the City Council
required all employees of the police and fire departments to maintain
their residence within corporate limits. When the resolution was
adopted, Meridian had a council-manager form of government.
In the recent case of Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F. 2d 900
(1975), the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, acted upon a
suit brought as a class action by a group of nonresident firemen
wherein they challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance
requiring all city employees under civil service to maintain their
residence within the City of Jackson. The Court held that the city
could validly enact the policy of requiring residence within the city
free of any federal restraint. When the ordinance was enacted,
Jackson had a commission form of government.
Considering the foregoing, it is the opinion of this office that as a
matter of policy, the government authorities of a Mississippi
municipality may, in principle, enact an ordinance requiring all
municipal employees to maintain their residence within the corporate
limits.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: , - E.
S. E. Birdsong, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
SEB, Jr/mg
OPINION NO. SO 79-17
SUBJECT CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES ARE REQUIRED TO
BE REPORTED PRIOR TO ELECTION, AS WELL AS SIXTY DAYS
AFTER THE ELECTION. Mississippi Code Annotated § 23-3-41(3)
(1972) requires all reportable expenditures to be listed and filed
within a four month period prior to the election. The only other report
is not required until sixty days after the election.
DATE RENDERED: April 24, 1979
REQUESTED BY Hon. Charles Pickering
OPINION BY A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by Donald
Clark, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
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I am in receipt of your letter of April 19, 1979, wherein you
inquire as to whether expenditures are required to be reported at any
time other than sixty (60) days after the date of the election at which
the result as to the particular candidate is decided.
Upon receipt of your inquiry, I checked with other attorneys in
this office and with the Office of the Secretary of State. It seems that
there has been some degree of uncertainty over this issue of whether
any other expenditure reports are required to be filed.
As cited in your letter of request, Section 23-3-41(3), Mississippi
Code of 1972, Annotated, as amended, states, in part, as follows:
Each candidate shall list in this first report all contributions and
expenditures which are required to be reported by this chapter which
are received or made for the purpose of the campaign at any time prior
to the date of the report. The first report shall also list all personal
property used by a candidate, including transportation vehicles and
airplanes, after the date of the candidate's public announcement of his
candidacy or the date of qualification by the candidate, whichever is
earlier; provided, however, that the value of the use of such property
equals or exceeds the amount required to be reported and is not owned
by the candidate.
Based on the foregoing language, the office attorneys who
prepared the "Guide to the 1978 Campaign Disclosure Act"
concluded that Section 23-3-41(3), supra, required the listing of all
reportable expenditures on the first report due to be filed within the
four month period prior to the election. After this initial expenditure
report, no further expenditure report is required until sixty (60) days
after the election as which time the post-election report becomes due.
As stated in the preface to the "Guide to the 1978 Campaign
Disclosure Act", the conclusions reached therein were not considered
to be official opinions of the Attorney General. However, in light of
the confusion concerning expenditure reports, this letter is intended to
establish these conclusions as the official opinion of the Attorney
General relative to expenditure reports.
In response to your telephone inquiry, this is to advise that where
a reporting deadline falls on a weekend or holiday when official
offices are closed, the required report shall be filed on the last day that
said offices are open prior to the deadline.
With personal regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATrORNEY GENERAL
BY & A
Donald Clark, Jr.




OPINION NO. SO 79-18
SUBJECT: AUTHORITY OF THE STATE HIGHWAY
COMMISSION TO INCREASE THE LOAD LIMIT OF TRUCKS ON
AN EMERGENCY BASIS. The load limit on perishable farm
products may be increased by the Motor Vehicle Comptroller. Upon
application and a showing of good cause, the State Highway
Commission may issue a special permit to allow weights in excess of
the maximum. In an emergency situation the Governor could call a
Special Session of the Legislature to consider the matter.
DATE RENDERED: June 18, 1979
REQUESTED BY. Hon. John R. Tabb
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
I am in receipt of your letter dated June 18, 1979 as follows:
Section 65-1-45, Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated, gives the
State Highway Commission the authority to restrict or to reduce the
allowable weight permitted on any State highway or bridge. Section
63-5-33, Mississippi Code of 1972, sets up the maximum weight
allowable except by individual application under Section 63-5-51,
Mississippi Code of 1972.
Does the State Highway Commission have the authority to increase
the load limit to 80,000 pounds on the Interstate System to both
intrastate and interstate truckers on an emergency basis for a period of
30 days?
We understand that the Governor and Commissioner of
Agriculture have requested that you increase load limits for Interstate
and Intrastate truckers on an emergency basis.
As you are aware, the Legislature has, on numerous occasions,
considered the question of increasing weight limits on the highways of
the State of Mississippi and has consistently declined to do so, and that
there is no authority to grant a blanket increase in weight limits
without legislative authorization.
The Legislature has, by Section 27-19-83, Mississippi Code of
1972, authorized the Motor Vehicle Comptroller to issue permits to
persons hauling perishable farm products, vegetables and fruits and
dairy products to increase the load not to exceed two tons in excess of
the amount allowed for that particular truck as provided by the tag
purchased, as long as said products are produced in Mississippi, for a
period not to exceed twenty days.
In addition, thereto, Section 63-5-51, Mississippi Code of 1972,
authorizes the State Highway Commission, with respect to highways
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under its jurisdiction, upon application in writing and for good cause
shown, to issue a special permit for weights in excess of the maximum
otherwise provided by statute, in conformance with and subject to the
specific provisions of said section.
Should the Governor deem the situation such as to constitute
economic or other emergency, he is, of course, authorized to call a




OPINION NO. SO 79-19
SUBJECT: AUTHORITY OF SUPERVISORS TO
APPROPRIATE ADVERTISING MONIES TO AID CITIZENS
AGAINST NUCLEAR TRASH. Mississippi Code Annotated § §
17-3-1, 3 (1972) grants proper authority to expend funds if the
purpose is found to be in the "other interests . . ." of the county.
Proper order should be entered upon the minutes to that effect.
DATE RENDERED: February 12, 1979
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Jeffrey Hollimon
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by John W.
Weston, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Your letter request of February 7, 1979, addressed to Honorable
A. F. Summer, Attorney General, has been received and assigned to
this writer for research and reply. Your letter states:
As Attorney for the Perry County Board of Supervisors, I have been
directed to write your office for a written opinion.
The salt dome formations in Perry County have recently been
selected by the Federal Department of Energy as a possible site for a
Nuclear Waste Repository. The Board of Supervisors have determined
that such a repository would be highly undesirable for Perry County for
a variety of reasons and that opposition to such would be in the best
interest of the county and its citizens. In order to more formalize their
opposition, the Board called a public meeting for the purpose of
forming a citizen's organization. After forming the citizen's group, a
central committee of fifteen members was selected to further organize
and direct the activities of the group. For an organization name, the
committee adopted Citizens Against Nuclear Trash (CANT).
[Vol. 1:345
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CANT has now approached the Board of Supervisors, as well as all
municipalities within the county, requesting an appropriation to help
support the advertising campaign demonstrating the disapproval and
opposition of Perry County citizens to the establishment of a Nuclear
Waste Repository in the County. The Board of Supervisors feels that
such an appropriation should be allowed under Sections 17-3-1 and
17-3-3, Mississippi Code of 1972, dealing with promotion of the moral,
financial and other interest of the county. Would such an appropriation
be legal if the Board affirmatively finds and adjudicates that such
would promote and advance the moral, financial and other interests of
Perry County and its citizens? If not, then would such an appropriation
be legal under any other provision of law?
Another question concerning this same matter is that if such an
appropriation would be illegal under all existing laws, could this
authority be derived from a Local and Private Bill of the Mississippi
Legislature, assuming they would pass such a measure?
Your referenced sections are as follows:
§ 17-3-1. Counties and municipalities may advertise resources.
The board of supervisors of any county in Mississippi, and the mayor and
board of aldermen or board of commissioners of any municipality in the State
of Mississippi, may in their discretion, set aside, appropriate and expend
moneys, not to exceed one mill of their respective valuation and assessment
for the purpose of advertising and bringing into favorable notice the
opportunities, possibilities and resources of such municipality or county.
§ 17-3-3. Advertising, kind included.
Advertising pursuant to section 17-3-1 shall include newspaper and
magazine advertising and literature, publicity, expositions, public
entertainment or other form of advertising or publicity, which in the
judgment of such board or boards will be helpful toward advancing the
moral, financial and other interests of such municipality or county.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is the opinion of this office that if the Board makes a finding of
fact pursuant to said statutes that it is in the "... . other interests .. "
of the county and enters a proper order upon its minutes to that effect,
funds may be expended for the purpose set forth in your inquiry.
Sincerely yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
John M. Weston
Special Assistant Attorney General
JMW/ped
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OPINION NO. SO 79-20
SUBJECT. AUTHORITY FOR A MUNICIPALITY TO
REGULATE THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF EMPLOYEES.
Inquiries concerning The Hatch Act should be addressed to the United
States Civil Service Commission. The recent United States Supreme
Court case of Dougherty County v. White is also relevant. Regulations
may need to be submitted to the Office of the Attorney General of the
United State for preclearance.
DATE RENDERED: March 26, 1979
REQUESTED BY: Mr. John W. Campbell
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General by S. E.
Birdsong, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General A. F. Summer has received your letter and has
assigned it to me for research and reply.
Your letter states:
The City Board has directed that I request your opinion on a
Section in our personnel policy. The Section applies to employee
political activity as follows.
SECTION XV: Employee Political Activity
A. This policy is stated to preserve a workforce designed to
achieve maximum public service and to maintain both the
integrity of City employees and the respect of the public which
they serve.
B. Any political activity by employees of the City of West
Point on City property and during City working hours is
expressly prohibited.
C. Any City employee who qualifies and runs for any Public
Elected Office shall be required to take a leave of absence,
without pay, thirty (30) days before the date of the election
and such leave of absence shall run until the designated
election date.
D. Any City employee who is elected to a local, state, or
federal office shall permanently resign his or her position with
the City prior to taking office.
The Board desires to know if this Section is in violation of the 1964
Voting Rights Act, the Hatch Act or any recent Supreme Court
decisions.
Initially, we are obliged to say that that part of your inquiry
relating to the Hatch Act is not susceptible to an opinion of this office
since it would require an opinion concerning a Federal statute.
[Vol. 1:345
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However, we can state that the Hatch Act (5 U.S.C. 1501-1508) is
enforced by the United States Civil Service Commission and that the
enclosed copy of Summary Statement Regarding Political Activity of
State and Local Officers and Employees includes instruction on how
to apply to the Commission for assistance in resolving any question as
to whether the Act applies.Attached for your information and reference is a copy of a letter
of January 29, 1979, from this office to Honorable Stephen W.
Rimmer of Jackson, which is relevant to your inquiry.
The attached copy cites and discusses the recent United States
Supreme Court case of Dougherty Co., Georgia, Board of Education,
et al v. John E. White, __ U. S. -. 58 L. Ed. 2d 269, 99 S. Ct.
__ . The Dougherty Cnunty case treated the matter of a
requirement that an employee of a county board of education was
required to take a leave of absence without pay upon becoming a
candidate for elective office. This requirement is similar to paragraph
C. of Section XV of your personnel policy.
Dougherty Ccwnty did not decide the substantial question of the
constitutionality of the employee leave requirement in that case. It did
decide that such a requirement imposed after the effective date of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 should be submitted for
Federal approval before implementation.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that if the City of West Point, or
its agencies, are to attempt enforcement of the requirement of
paragraph C, supra, then the requirement should be submitted to the
Office of the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance.
Noting the language in Dougherty County expressing the Court's
concern for the possibility of discrimination resulting from
constraints on employee political activity, it is recommended that you
consider submitting the requirements of paragraphs B. and D. of
Section XV of your personnel policy for preclearance.
We trust this will be of assistance to you.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, AT-1ORNEY GENERAL
BY:
S. E. Birdsong, Jr.
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OPINION NO. SO 79-21
SUBJECT. AUTHORITY OF A MUNICIPALITY TO REDUCE
AD VALOREM TAXES OF FLOOD VICTIMS. A municipality may
reappraise and reduce the taxes on flood damaged property.
However, there is no statutory authority for the arbitrary cancellation
of an assessment for a chosen period of time. Further, no statutory
authority exists to permit tax exemption in whole or part for such a
selected period of time.
DATE RENDERED: July 9, 1979
REQUESTED BY. Hon. Alfred G. Nicols, Jr.
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General by S. E.
Birdsong, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General.
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General A. F. Summer has received your letter and has
assigned it to me for research and reply.
Your letter states:
I represent the City of Richland, Mississippi. As you are no doubt
aware, approximately one-third of the residences in the City of
Richland had some flood damage and inundation as a result of the
recent Pearl River flooding.
The Board of Aldermen of the City has considered various
proposals as to how the City might assist these flood victims financially
to recover from their losses.
The Richland City Board has now asked me to write to your office
for an advisory opinion as to whether the City Board could exempt
from municipal taxation for this year, and maybe two years, property
which had sustained flood damage in an amount of, hypothetically
$1,000.00 or more, or some such figure as set by the Board.
Mississippi Code of 1972, Section 21-33-43, provides that the city
board may reduce or increase city ad valorem assessments for the same
reason and in like manner as may be done by the county for county
assessments. Mississippi Code of 1972, Section 27-35-143, provides that
the county may "change or decrease an assessment" where the
property "has depreciated in value on account of any such accident or
occurrence as the foregoing" (i.e. flood).
We are quite sure that these sections would allow the city to
reappraise the property in accordance with the damage that has been
done and to reduce the taxes according to a reappraisal. This would be
expensive and cumbersome to the city; however, and the City Board
prefers to simply cancel the assessment for a year or two or make the
property exempt for a year or two on account of the flood damage and
loss. The property owners would be required to file a petition and an
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affidavit verifying their flood loss and damage in order to qualify for an
exemption or cancellation of their ad valorem tax.
Can you see any interpretation of the subject statutes, or any other
statutes applicable to the matter, which is contrary to the Board's
desires, plans and wishes to cancel assessments for the relief of the
City's flood victims in accordance with the plans hereinabove outlined?
We are obliged to say that although reassessment may be
expensive and cumbersome to the city, we are of the opinion that the
provisions of Sections 21-33-43 and 27-35-143 of the Mississippi Code
of 1972, Annotated, do not authorize the simple cancellation of an
assessment for a year or two or permit tax exemption in whole or in an
arbitrary and uniform amount for a year or two on account of flood
damage and loss. Further, we do not find any such statutory authority
elsewhere.
We regret that we are unable to respond to you otherwise.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
S. E. Birdsong, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
SEBJr./mg
OPINION NO. SO 79-22
SUBJECT CERTAIN TANGIBLE PROPERTY IS NOT
EXEMPT FROM AD VALOREM TAXES FOR SCHOOL DISTRICT
PURPOSES. Tangible property includes both real and personal
property. Tangible property used in the manufacturing operation or
necessary to some manufacturers and other new enterprises may be
exempt from ad valorem taxes.
DATE RENDERED: February 13, 1979
REQUESTED BY. Hon. Melvin Mitchell
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by S. E.
Birdsong, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General A. F. Summer has received your letter and has
assigned it to me for research and reply.
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Your letter states:
In the above section (Section 27-31-101, Mississippi Code of 1972)
there appears the language .... Provided, however, said governing
authority shall not exempt ad valorem taxes for school district purposes
on tangible proert.y... (Emphasis added). Since this language appears
to be plainly prohibitive, it is of importance that the term "tangible
property" be fully understood.
As used in this statute, does "tangible property" include real estate,
buildings, machinery, improvements, equipment, inventory, and raw
materials? If it does not include all of the above, and any others which I
have failed to list, which of the above and others not listed does the term
include?
Section 27-31-101 of the Code cited in your letter provides in
part:
Enumeration of new enterprises which may
be exempted.
County boards of supervisors and municipal authorities are hereby
authorized and empowered, in their discretion, to grant exemptions
from ad valorem taxation, except state ad valorem taxation. Provided,
however, said governing authorities shall not exempt ad valorem taxes
for school district purposes on tangible property used in, or necessary to
the operation of the manufacturers and other new enterprises
hereinafter enumerated by classes, nor shall they exempt from ad
volorem taxes the products thereof or automobiles and trucks belonging
to the said manufacturers or other new enterprises operating on and
over the highways of the State of Mississippi ....
Any exemption from ad valorem taxes heretofore granted to
existing enterprises shall continue in full force and effect but only as to
tangible oropegay heretofore included in the exemption but not as to
tangible property that may be later- added as an addition or
improvements to the exempt tangible property.
(Emphasis Supplied)
This section gives a list of enterprises which may be exempt and
uses the terms "factories", "mills", "manufacturing plants" and
"refineries". Except for a reference to pipeline facilities and
terminals, grain elevators, plants and factories for recycling natural
gas, and refineries for petroleum products, the section does not specify
what particular pieces of property are included or excluded in the
exemption. "Tangible property" is not defined in the section.
An elementary definition of the term "tangible property" is given
in Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, at Page 1627:
TANGIBLE PROPERTY. That which may be felt or touched, and is
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necessarily corporeal, although it may be either real or personal. H. D.
& J. K. Crosswell, Inc., v. Jones, D.C.S.C., 52 F.2d 880, 883.
In Woolrich v. St. Catherine Gravel Co., 188 Miss. 417, 195 So.
307, 127 A. L. R. 1179 (1940), mention is made of the term but no
definition is found in this case. Our research did not otherwise
disclose a Mississippi case which treats or defines the term.
Adams County v. National Box Co., 125 Miss. 598, 88 So. 168 (1921),
interpreted Chapter 100, Laws of 1916, Hemingway's Code, Sections
6878 and 6879, a predecessor statute to Section 27-31-101. When in-
terpreting the law as to what is exempt, the Court said at Page 169:
(1, 2) The exemption allowed goes only to the manufacturing
plant, which includes those things necessary in and to its operation. The
language of the act, "all permanent factories or plants of the kind
hereinafter named.. .shall be exempt, from all state, county and levee
taxation," means all of the real estate. buildings. machineKy. improve-
ments. and eauioments forming a part of and belonging to the plant, or
any other personal proerty forming a part of the plant, essential to,
-nd necessarily used in. its operation. Exemption statutes are to be
strictly construed aainst exemptions to persons or corporations for
gai and it seems clear to us the act here involved does not grant
exemption to the box company on its raw materials and finished pro-
ducts, but goes only to the manufacturing plant and the things
necessarily used in its operation. The personal property here assessed
was no essential part of the plant, and is therefore subject to taxation.
The steamboat used exclusively in transporting logs to the factory
is not exempt from taxation because it is not a necessary part, or equip-
ment, of the plant. It is not shown by the record that logs could not have
been transported to the factory by other means, or that the plant could
not have operated, without the use of the boat to transport the materials
for manufacturing purposes. Those things or euipments of the plant
which are exempt from taxation must be used directly in the manufac-
turing operations of the factory. otherwise they are not exempt. In this
view it appears that the steamboat was not exempt as a necessary part
of the factory .... (Emphasis Supplied)
By letter of October 25, 1977 from Honorable John M. Weston,
Special Assistant Attorney General, to Mr. Jim Wetzel, Tax Assessor
of Harrison County, this office expressed the opinion that, based upon
an amendment to the law in 1922, raw materials and supplies used in
plant operation are exempt from ad valorem assessment under Section
27-31-101 and related Code sections.
Meador v. Mac-Smith Garment Co., 188 Miss. 98, 191 So. 129
(1939), construed Section 19, Chapter 18 of the First Extraordinary
Session of 1936, Section 3109, Code of 1930, a predecessor statute to
Section 27-31-101, and concerned a claim of tax exemption said to be
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granted by the county to a certain garment factory site, building,
machinery, and equipment in Harrison County upon the basis that the
industry constituted a new factory and new enterprise.
The issue of whether the industry was entitled to exemption was
resolved in favor of the industry claiming tax exemption. We read this
case to necessarily include the site, building, machinery and equip-
ment used in the operation of the industry.
After considering the foregoing, we conclude that as to Section
27-31-101:
1. That "tangible property" includes both real and personal
property; and,
2. That tangible property used in, or necessary to, the operation
of the manufacturers and other new enterprises may be ex-
empted except for ad valorem taxes for school district pur-
poses; and,
3. That tangible property includes all of the real estate,
buildings, machinery, improvements and equipments forming
a part of and belonging to the plant, essential to, and
necessarily used in, its operation; and,
4. That raw materials and supplies used in plant operation are
tangible property that may be exempted except for ad
valorem taxes for school district purposes; and,
5. That to be exempt tangible property must be used directly in
the manufacturing operation.
It is suggested that as to items of property not specified, you may
address further inquiries to us.
We trust this will be of assistance to you.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: k"jr.
S. E. Birdsong, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
SEB, Jr/mg
OPINION NO. CR 79-02
SUBJECT: AUTHORITY OF SUPERVISORS TO ENACT AN
ORDINANCE IMPOSING A PENALTY FOR TAMPERING WITH
OR DAMAGING CABLE TELEVISION EQUIPMENT. There are no
criminal statutes related to the proposed ordinance. Further, there
exists no authority for the passage of such an ordinance. Therefore,




DATE RENDERED: March 6, 1979
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Boyce Holleman
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by John M.
Weston, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Your letter request of February 27, 1979, addressed to Honorable
A. F. Summer, Attorney General, has been received and assigned to
this writer for research and reply. Your letter states:
The Board of Superviors of Harrison County has been requested to
enact an ordinance to impose a penalty for the unauthorized tampering
with or damage to cable television equipment, a copy of which is
enclosed herewith.
We have been unable to locate any specific authority for the
passage of this ordinance and respectfully request your opinion as to
whether the Board may pass same, and if so, under what authority.
A TV station or community TV antenna service is not a public
utility per § 77-3-3(3). We further examined the following statutes:
§ 97-7-31: Destroying injuring, etc. state of federally licensed
communication systems.
§ 97-25-1: Electric power lines and facilities - tampering, injury or
unauthorized use - . ...
§ 97-25-3: Meters - tampering with electric, gas or water meters.
and
§ 97-25-53: Telegraphs and telephones - injuring or destroying
lines -....
It is the opinion of this office that none of the above criminal
statutes are related to the proposed ordinance and, consequently, we
are unable to locate any authority for the passage of same. Perforce, it
would appear that such authority must necessarily come from an act
of the Legislature.
With kindest personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: wzda
John M. Weston
Special Assistant Attorney General
JWM/ped
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OPINION NO. CR 79-03
SUBJECT. INMATES CONFINED UNDER THE HABITUAL
CRIMINAL ACT MAY NOT BE AWARDED EARNED TIME
UNDER THE EARNED TIME CLASS SYSTEM. Habitual offenders
are not entitled to parole. Therefore, they could never use earned time
to reduce the term of their sentence. The legislature has purposefully
differentiated between habitual offenders and the rest of the inmate
population.
DATE RENDERED: March 15, 1979
REQUESTED BY. Mr. B. C. Ruth
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by Larry J.
Stroud, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General A. F. Summer has received your opinion
request of March 13, 1979, and has assigned it to me for reply.
In your letter you state:
We have a number of inmates now confined serving sentences
under Habitual Criminal Act 99-19-81 and 99-19-83. Both sections of
the Code specify that "such sentences shall not be reduced or suspended
nor shall such persons be eligible for Parole or Probation."
Please advise if this forbids the awarding of earned time that might
be accumulated under the Earned Time Class System.
In Sections 99-19-81 and 99-19-83 of the Mississippi Code 1972,
as annotated and amended, there is found in reference to the sentences
of habitual offenders the following language: "such sentence shall not
be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for Parole or
Probation." This language evinces the clear intent that a habitual
offender serve his full sentence without any reduction of time or
release on any program, excepting pardon by the governor.
In Section 47-5-139 of the Mississippi Code 1972, as annotated
and amended, there is the following limitation on earned time:
No inmate in any event shall have his sentence terminated by
administrative earned time action until he is eligible for parole as
provided in Title 47, Chapter 7, Mississippi Code of 1972.
Habitual offenders, under Section 47-7-3 of the Mississippi Code
1972, as annotated and amended, are not entitled to parole, and
therefore could never use earned time to reduce the term of their
sentence.
In Section 47-5-138 of the Mississippi Code 1972, as annotated
and amended, which directs the promulgating of rules and
regulations concerning earned time, there is found the following
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language. "Such rules and regulations shall differentiate between
habitual offenders for the purposes of awarding earned time." Here
again the legislature has evidenced the intention that habitual
offenders be treated differently concerning earned time than the rest
of the inmate population. The statute does not state what the rules and
regulations are to say, but from 99-19-81, 99-19-83, and 47-5-139, it
is apparent that habitual offenders were not intended to be allowed
any type or form of reduction of their sentence.
It is, therefore, our opinion that habitual offenders convicted
under the provisions of 99-19-81 or 99-19-83 are not entitled to
earned time.
Trusting that the above will be of value to you, I am and remain
Sincerely yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATrORNEY GENERAL
BY:
Larry J. Stroud
Special Assistant Attorney General
LJS:cm
OPINION NO. CV 79-03
SUBJECT: THE PURCHASE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE BY A
MUNICIPALITY AND ITS EFFECT ON GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY. Miss. Code Ann. § 21-15-6 (1972), provides authority
for a municipality to purchase general liability insurance coverage.
Any recovery in an action against the municipality shall be limited to
the proceeds of the liability insurance coverage. Likewise, any waiver
of immunity as to any governmental function by municipality is
limited only by the proceeds of such liability insurance coverage.
DATE REQUESTED. October 27, 1978
REQUESTED BY. Hon. Wiley J. Barbour
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by S. E.
Birdsong, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your letter of October 10,
1978, and has assigned it to me for research qnd reply.
Your letter states:
As attorney for the City of Yazoo City I have been requested by the
Board of Mayor and Aldermen to inquire whether there would be any
statutory prohibition against the City of Yazoo City as a municipal
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corporation to purchase liability insuance coverage in blanket form on
its police department and fire department emergency vehicles.
The City has liability coverage on its non-emergency vehicles with
other departments, however, it appears that until recently there was no
coverage available on emergency vehicles. However, a local insurance
agent now assures the City that he could get a quotation if the City has
the authority to purchase such liability insurance....
Section 21-15-6 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated states:
... Purchase of general liability insurance coverage;
effect on municipal liability.
Municipalities are hereby authorized, in the discretion of the
governing authorities, to purchase general liability insurance coverage,
including errors and omissions insurance for municipal officials and
municipal employees.
Nothing contained herein shall be considered as a waiver of
immunity in whole or in part as to any governmental function
attempted or undertaken by the municipality except that where the
municipality has liability insurance coverage as to any action brought
against it, then such action may be maintained against such
municipality, but any recovery in such action shall be limited solely to
the proceeds of any such liability insurance coverage and a judgment
creditor shall have recourse only to the proceeds of such liability
insurance coverage. Any judgment rendered in excess of the limits of
such insurance shall, on motion of the court, be reduced as to the
municipality to the amount of said liability insurance coverage but not
as to any joint tort-feasor, if any. No attempt shall be made in the trial
of any case to suggest the existence of any insurance which covers in
whole or in part any judgment that may be rendered against any
municipality.
It is the opinion of this office that Section 21-15-6, supra, provides
authority for the City of Yazoo City to purchase general liability
insurance coverage on its police and fire department emergency
vehicles.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: k r
S. E. Birdsong, Jr.




OPINION NO. CR 79-04
SUBJECT IS HOUSE BILL NO. 76 CONCERNING PAROLE
LAWS VIOLATIVE OF THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS? Parole laws are a part
of the "law annexed to the crime." For such legislation to be violative
of the ex post facto clause it must be punitive. The intent of House bill
No. 76 is not to punish probationers and parolees. Rather, its purpose
is to administer a program of restitution and to facilitate the
reintroduction of offenders into society.
DATE RENDERED: June 28, 1979
REQUESTED BY: -Ion. David W. Hall
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by J. Stephen
Wright, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Selected portion of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as
follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your letter of request
dated June 18, 1979, and has assigned it to me for research and reply.
You submit the following:
It will be greatly appreciated if you would provide this office with
an opinion advising as to whether or not the Act in question [H. B. No.
76, appearing at page 21 of Advance Sheet No. 8, Regular Session of
1979] can affect persons placed on probation or parole before the
effective date of the Act, viz, July 1, 1979. There has been some
confusion in this area as to whether or not the $10.00 can be collected
from those who are presently on parole or probation ....
In personal consultation you further indicated that your request
is directed solely to the question of whether H. B. 76 is violative of the
ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. United
States Constitution, Article 1, Section 10; Mississippi Constitution,
Article 3, Section 16. This opinion is limited to the ex post facto issue.
To facilitate a logical progression, the relevant portions of H. B.
No. 76, appearing at pages 21-23 of Advance Sheet No. 8, Regular
Session of 1979, are set out below:
Section 1. Any offender on probation or released from a facility of
the Department of Corrections on parole, earned probation, work
release or supervised earned release, who remains under the supervision
of the Department of Corrections and after the effective date of this act,
shall pay to the department the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) per month
by certified check or money order.
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[Tihe foregoing statute applies on its face to probationers and
parolees released before the effective date of the act but remaining
under the supervision of the Department of Corrections after the
effective date.
For purposes of the legislation in question the applicable
definition of ex post facto laws is as follows: A law is ex post facto if it
changes the punishment for a crime, thereby inflicting greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Ball.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798).
In light of this definition, the obvious threshold question is
whether parole laws are part of the "law annexed to the crime when
committed." Calder v. Bull, supra. If not, then the instant legislation
cannot be ex post facto.
Several courts, however, have held that parole laws, at least in-
sofar as they deal with computing parole eligibility, are part of "the
law annexed to the crime when committed" and'cannot be applied ex
post facto. See Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 41
L.Ed.2d 283 (1974); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 297, 57 S.Ct.
797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648 (2 Cir.
1977); Love v. Fitzharris, 460 F.2d 282 (9 Cir. 1972); State v.
Bullock, 269 So.2d 824 (La. 1972). See also Rodrigues v. U. S. Parole
Comm'n and Metropolitan Center, - F.2d - (7 Cir March
20, 1979), cited in United States v. Addonizio, - U.S. ... 47
USLW 4628, 4629 n.9 (June 4, 1979). In addition, the Mississippi
Supreme Court in obiter dictum has recently indicated that it would
follow this line of cases if presented with an instance where parole-
eligibility legislation were applied ex post facto. Taylor v. Miss. State
Probation and Parole Board, 365 So. 2d 621, 622 (Miss. 1978). Parole
laws, therefore, are not separate and distinct from the criminal laws,
but are, at least in some respects, a part of the "law annexed to the
crime."
Having answered the seminal question in the affirmative, we
must turn to a second special consideration: For the instant legisla-
tion to be proscribed by the ex post facto clause it must be punitive.
Retrospective application of laws which are neither punitive nor
criminal is not forbidden, and whether legislation is punitive depends
to a considerable degree upon the aim of the legislature in passing it.
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d
1435, 1445-50 (1960).
Furthermore, statutory enactments which impose some hardship
because of past acts, but which are enacted to regulate some present
situation, are not punitive, and, therefore not ex post facto, despite the
imposition of hardship. Flemming v. Nestor. 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct.
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1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960); DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 80
S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960).
These pronouncements, enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Flemming and DeVeau, save the instant statute from a constitutional
demise. It is the considered opinion of this office that the legislature,
in passing the statute under consideration, had no intent or purpose to
punish probationers and parolees. The true intent of the act is ap-
parent on its face. Money collected between June 30, 1979, and July
1, 1980, is to be expended in the establishment of restitution centers
for victims of crime. Money collected from and after July 1, 1980, is
to be used to supplement payment by the State of Mississippi to prison
inmates on discharge from the state's penal system. As was the case in
Flemming and DeVeau, hardship is imposed upon probationers and
parolees because of their prior misdeeds, but the purpose of the
legislation is not to punish but rather to regulate and to administer
first a program of restitution to victims and then a program to
facilitate the reintroduction of offenders into society. Consequently,
as applied to probationers and parolees who were released prior to Ju-
ly 1, 1979, but who remain under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections thereafter, the instant legislation is not an illegal ex
post facto law. In a word, the Department of Corrections, pursuant to
the legislation in question, can collect $10.00 per month from all
parolees and probationers under their supervision.
Sincerely,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
J. Stephen Wright
Special Assistant Attorney General
JSW: bl
OPINION NO. CV 79-04
SUBJECT: AUTHORITY OF TRUSTEES TO PAY CLAIMS
ARISING OUT OF THE NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF ANY
SCHOOL VEHICLE. Trustees are authorized to pay claims only after
a finding of negligence. Miss. Code Ann. § § 37-41-37, 41 (1972)
limits the amount of compensation payable. Payments in excess of
these amounts may be made only after suit is filed.
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DATE RENDERED: February 5, 1979
REQUESTED BY. Hon. Jeremy J. Eskridge
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by George M.
Swindoll, Assistant Attorney General
*Selected portion of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as
follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your letter of request and
has assigned it to me for research and reply.
Under the provisions of Section 37-41-37, Mississippi Code of
1972, as amended, any person receiving inquiries or sustaining
damages "(a) arising out of the negligent operation of any school bus
or other vehicle owned by any county or any municipal separate
school district or public junior college district or consolidated school
district, or operated by such county or municipal separate school
district or public junior college district by private contract, for the
transportation of pupils to and from the public schools of such
county, or municipal separate school district or junior college, or (b)
caused by a bus while being operation in pursuance of any activity of
any of such schools, or (c) arising by reason of negligence in the
maintenance, upkeep, repair or mechanical failure of such vehicle,
• .." shall have a right of action against the . ..school district.
(Emphasis Added)
It is the opinion of this office that, except in the event of a court
order or judgment providing otherwise, the trustees of a school
district may not lawfully authorize payment of a claim without first
having found and determined that the accident arose due to the
negligent operation of "by reason of negligence" in the maintenance,
etc. of the vehicle. Additionally, the trustees may not pay in excess of
One Thousand Dollars ($ 1,000.00) per claimant per accident for
property damages or hospital, medical and doctor bills in an amount
not to exceed $550.00 per person per accident unless claim is made
for same by way of suit. "Settlements and compromises" as referred
to in the second paragraph of said Section 37-41-37 are limited to
these limitations, as more specifically stated in the last paragraph of
Section 37-41-41. Any amount in excess of this can be lawfully paid
only after suit is filed.
The school districts are protected by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from suits in excess of the amounts set by Section 37-41-41,
supra.
In summary, the trustees are authorized to pay claims only if it is
found and determined as a fact that negligence, either in the
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operation or maintenance, repair, unkeep, or mechanical failure
caused the damage or injury and only then for the amounts prescribed
in the last paragraph of Section 37-41-41, supra. Payment for
damages or personal injuries in excess of this amount may be made
only after suit is filed.
Very truly yours,






George M. Swindoll served the State of Mississippi in the Office of
the Attorney General from July 1, 1971 until his death on June 22,
1979. His character was an inspiration; his dedication an example.
The MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW expresses its deepest
appreciation for his support and encouragement.
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